Sunday, March 05, 2006

¿Una guerra nuclear en el 2007?

¿una guerra nuclear en el 2007? esta nota habla sobre un tema al que me voy a referir mucho en este blog y es el peligro que representa un Iran nuclear,en esta nota se habla sobre las causas de una guerra nuclear entre Iran e Israel:
Niall Ferguson:
Looking back at the conflict with Tehran January 17, 2006
ARE we living through the origins of the next world war? Certainly, it is easy to imagine how a future historian might deal with the next phase of events in the Middle East:WITH every passing year after the turn of the century, the instability of the Gulf region grew. By the beginning of 2006, nearly all the combustible ingredients for a conflict - far bigger in its scale and scope than the wars of 1991 or 2003 - were in place. The first underlying cause of the war was the increase in the region's relative importance as a source of petroleum. On the one hand, the rest of the world's oil reserves were being rapidly exhausted. On the other, the breakneck growth of the Asian economies had caused a huge surge in global demand for energy. It is hard to believe today, but for most of the 1990s the price of oil had averaged less than $20 a barrel. A second precondition of war was demographic. While European fertility had fallen below the natural replacement rate in the '70s, the decline in the Islamic world had been much slower. By the late '90s the fertility rate in the eight Muslim countries to the south and east of the European Union was 2.5 times higher than the European figure. This tendency was especially pronounced in Iran, where the social conservatism of the 1979 revolution combined with the high mortality of the Iran-Iraq war and the subsequent baby boom to produce, by the first decade of the new century, a quite extraordinary surplus of young men. More than two-fifths of the population of Iran in 1995 had been aged 14 or younger. This was the generation that was ready to fight in 2007. This not only gave Islamic societies a youthful energy that contrasted markedly with the slothful senescence of Europe. It also signified a profound shift in the balance of world population. In 1950, there were three times as many people in Britain as in Iran. By 1995, the population of Iran had overtaken that of Britain and was forecast to be 50 per cent higher by 2050. Yet people in the West struggled to grasp the implications of this shift. Subliminally, they still thought of the Middle East as a region they could lord it over, as they had in the mid-20th century. The third and perhaps most important precondition for war was cultural. Since 1979, not just Iran but the greater part of the Muslim world had been swept by a wave of religious fervour, the very opposite of the process of secularisation that was emptying Europe's churches. Although few countries followed Iran down the road to full-blown theocracy, there was a transformation in politics everywhere. From Morocco to Pakistan, the feudal dynasties or military strongmen who had dominated Islamic politics since the '50s came under intense pressure from religious radicals. The ideological cocktail that produced Islamism was as potent as either of the extreme ideologies the West had produced in the previous century, communism and fascism. Islamism was anti-Western, anti-capitalist and anti-Semitic. A seminal moment was the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's intemperate attack on Israel in December 2005, when he called the Holocaust a myth. The state of Israel was a "disgraceful blot", he had previously declared, to be "wiped off the map". Before 2007, the Islamists had seen no alternative but to wage war against their enemies by means of terrorism. From Gaza to Manhattan, the hero of 2001 was the suicide bomber. Yet Ahmadinejad, a veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, craved a more serious weapon than strapped-on explosives. His decision to accelerate Iran's nuclear weapons program was intended to give Iran the kind of power North Korea already wielded in East Asia: the power to defy the US; the power to obliterate America's closest regional ally. Under different circumstances, it would not have been difficult to thwart Ahmadinejad's ambitions. The Israelis had shown themselves capable of pre-emptive air strikes against Iraq's nuclear facilities in 1981. Similar strikes against Iran's were urged on President George W. Bush by neo-conservative commentators throughout 2006. The US, they argued, was perfectly placed to carry out such strikes. It had the bases in neighbouring Iraq and Afghanistan. It had the intelligence proving Iran's contravention of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But the President was advised by his Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, to opt instead for diplomacy. Not just European opinion but American opinion was strongly opposed to an attack on Iran. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 had been discredited by the failure to find the weapons of mass destruction Saddam Hussein had supposedly possessed and by the failure of the US-led coalition to quell a bloody insurgency. Americans did not want to increase their military commitments overseas; they wanted to reduce them. Europeans did not want to hear that Iran was about to build its own WMD. Even if Ahmadinejad had broadcast a nuclear test live on CNN, liberals would have said it was a CIA con-trick. So history repeated itself. As in the 1930s, an anti-Semitic demagogue broke his country's treaty obligations and armed for war. Having first tried appeasement, offering the Iranians economic incentives to desist, the West appealed to international agencies: the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN's Security Council. Thanks to China's veto, however, the UN produced virtually nothing. Only one man might have stiffened Bush's resolve in the crisis: not British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who had wrecked his domestic credibility over Iraq and was in any case on the point of retirement, but Israel's Ariel Sharon. Yet he had been struck down by a stroke as the Iranian crisis came to a head. With Israel leaderless, Ahmadinejad had a free hand. As in the '30s, too, the West fell back on wishful thinking. Perhaps, some said, Ahmadinejad was only sabre-rattling because his domestic position was so weak. Perhaps his political rivals in the Iranian clergy were on the point of getting rid of him. In that case, the last thing the West should do was to take a tough line; that would only bolster Ahmadinejad by inflaming Iranian popular feeling. So in Washington and in London people crossed their fingers, hoping for the deus ex machina of a home-grown regime change in Tehran. This gave the Iranians all the time they needed to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium at Natanz. The dream of nuclear non-proliferation, already interrupted by Israel, Pakistan and India, was definitively shattered. Now Tehran had a nuclear missile pointed at Tel Aviv. And the new Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu had a missile pointed right back at Tehran. The optimists argued that the Cuban Missile Crisis would replay itself in the Middle East. Both sides would threaten war, and then both sides would blink. That was Rice's hope - indeed, her prayer - as she shuttled between the capitals. But it was not to be. The devastating nuclear exchange of August 2007 represented not only the failure of diplomacy, it marked the end of the oil age. Some even said it marked the twilight of the West. Certainly, that was one way of interpreting the subsequent spread of the conflict as Iraq's Shia population overran the remaining US bases in their country and the Chinese threatened to intervene on the side of Iran. Yet the historian is bound to ask whether or not the true significance of the 2007-11 war was to vindicate the Bush administration's original principle of pre-emption. For, if that had been adhered to in 2006, Iran's nuclear bid might have been thwarted at minimal cost. And the Great Gulf War might never have happened. Niall Ferguson is a professor of history at Harvard University.
esto hace años hubiera parecido delirante, pero tristemente hoy pareciera muy posible si el mundo occidental no hace nada con Iran, y cuando digo algo me refiero a una accion militar ya que se ve que los iranies estan empecinados en tener su bomba atomica y viendo que su presidente tiene unas ideas delirantes, como lo muestra esta nota:
"EL PRESIDENTE IRANÍ ANUNCIA AL 'MAHDI', EL MESÍAS DE LOS CHIÍTAS Ahmed Ahmadinejad parece convencido de que la aparición del mítico Duodécimo Imán es inminente Por : Redacción Una nueva palabra ha ingresado en el vocabulario político: mahdaviat, que significa tener fe en el Mahdi y apoyar su venida; impondrá el islam y gobernará la tierra antes del fin del mundo Los rumores sobre un recorte en la producción de petróleo iraní y una retirada de sus divisas de Europa han producido no poca inquietud en las altas instancias occidentales y sembrado la alarma en los mercados financieros. Y es que su nuevo presidente, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, no deja de producir escalofríos con su escalada de declaraciones beligerantes. Que reflejan un talante iluminado y mesiánico de los que pueden precipitar catástrofes notables.Una nueva palabra ha ingresado en el vocabulario político, cortesía del presidente de Irán, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: mahdaviat, el tener fe en el Mahdi y apoyar su venida”. El mahdi, “el bien guiado” en árabe, es una importante figura de la escatología religiosa islámica chií, “el restaurador de la religión y la justicia que gobernará antes del fin del mundo”, el retorno del Duodécimo Imán.Ahmadinejad plantea el tema a menudo, y no sólo entre musulmanes. Al dirigirse a Naciones Unidas en septiembre, Ahmadinejad dejaba perpleja a su audiencia de líderes políticos mundiales concluyendo su discurso con una oración por la llegada del Mahdi: “Oh poderoso Alá, te rezo para acelerar el surgimiento de tu última encarnación, el Prometido, ese ser humano puro y perfecto, el que llenará de justicia y paz este mundo”.De vuelta a Irán desde Nueva York, Ahmadinejad recordaba el efecto de su discurso de la ONU: "Uno de nuestro grupo me dijo que cuando comencé a decir “En el nombre de Alá, el clemente y Todopoderoso”, vio una luz a mi alrededor, y yo estaba colocado dentro de este aura. Yo mismo la sentí. Sentí que la atmósfera cambiaba de pronto, y durante esos 27 o 28 minutos, los líderes del mundo no parpadearon… Y estaban absortos. Parecía como si una mano los retuviera allí y les hubiera abierto los ojos para recibir el mensaje de la república islámica".En una aguda noticia, Scott Peterson, del Christian Science Monitor, ilustra la centralidad del mahdaviat en el enfoque de Ahmadinejad y explora sus implicaciones para sus políticas. Como alcalde de Teherán, por ejemplo, parece que Ahmadinejad dio órdenes al consistorio municipal en secreto en el 2004 de construir una gran avenida por donde accedería el Mahdi al encuentro de sus fieles. Un año más tarde, como presidente, destinó 17 millones de dólares a una mezquita de estilo persa en Jamkaran, al sur de la capital, asociada estrechamente con el mahdaviat. Ha promovido la construcción de una línea directa de ferrocarril Teherán-Jamkaran. Hizo que una lista de los miembros propuestos para su gabinete se depositara en un aljibe adyacente a la mezquita de Jamkaran, según se dice, con el fin de aprovechar su presunta conexión divina.Lo que Peterson llama “la obsesión presidencial” con el mahdaviat lleva a Ahmadinejad a "una certidumbre que deja poco espacio al compromiso. Desde remediar el vacío entre ricos y pobres en Irán hasta desafiar a América y a Israel y mejorar el poder de Irán con programas nucleares, todos los temas se diseñan para poner los cimientos para el retorno del Mahdi”.“Mahdaviat es una palabra clave para la revolución [Islámica de Irán], y es el espíritu de la revolución”, afirma el director de un instituto dedicado a estudiar y catalizar la llegada del Mahdi. “Esta clase de mentalidad le hace muy fuerte”, observa el editor político del diario Resalat, Amir Mohebian. “Si cree que el Mahdi va a llegar en dos, tres, o cuatro años, ¿por qué ser moderado? Ahora es el momento de ser fuerte y mantenerse firme”. Algunos iraníes, informa la PBS, “temen que su nuevo presidente no tenga miedo de la inquietud internacional, pudiendo pensar que es solamente una señal de Alá”.Los líderes más peligrosos de la historia moderna son los equipados con una ideología totalitaria y una fe mística en su propia misión (como Hitler). Mahmoud Ahmadinejad cumple ambos de estos criterios, como revelan sus comentarios en la ONU. Combinado con su futuro arsenal nuclear, eso le convierte en un adversario que tiene que ser detenido, y urgentemente, escribe el analista conservador Daniel Pipes.El Mahdaviat tiene implicaciones directas y siniestras para la confrontación Estados Unidos - Irán, afirma un partidario de Ahmadinejad, Hamidreza Taraghi, de la estricta Coalición Sociedad Islámica de Irán. Implica ver a Washington como el rival de Teherán, incluso como un falso Mahdi. Para Ahmadinejad, la principal prioridad es desafiar a América, y específicamente, crear un poderoso modelo de estado con el que oponérsele basado en la “democracia islámica”. Taraghi predice problemas serios en el horizonte.
viendo esas ideas delirantes, creo que es mas que urgente tomar medidas de tipo militar,que seguramente seran dolorosas pero lo peor seria no hacer nada

0 Comments:

Post a Comment

Links to this post:

Create a Link

<< Home